

Policy Responses to Climate Change in Developing Nations

Article Information

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ABSTRACT

This study explores policy responses to climate change among the developing countries highlighting the success and challenges continuing to be encountered. This analysis reveals that despite these countries having made international climate promises, laid down renewable energy targets and drawn national adaptation plans, nevertheless they tend not to translate them into actions due to a lack of money, not having sufficiently strong institutional frameworks or prioritising other developmental activities. The findings indicate that those countries that have a superior mode of governance and access to external sources of financial support are getting ahead with incorporating climate policies in their strategies towards sustainable development. At the same time, bottom-up innovation, localized resilience, and interregional cooperation can be deemed as an effective influencing factor of resilience in vulnerable areas. However, the regions differ as well. Certain nations are very dependent on foreign assistance whereas some nations lack consistency as well as effectiveness in policies. The outcomes indicate the significance of strengthening the capacity of institutions, promoting inclusive policy formulation, and simplifying the process through which people can receive climate funds to bridge the dissimilarity between the policymaking exercises and actual outcomes. This paper suggests that multi-level collaboration, or the combination of local strategies with national planning and international resources, is the key to making climate policy responses in poor countries both fair and effective in reduction of the negative impacts of climate change.

Keywords: *climate policy, developing nations, adaptation strategies, renewable energy, climate finance, sustainable development*

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INTRODUCTION

The direct threat to human life on the Earth due to climate change affects the developing countries the most because they assume little capability to respond to it. There are severe issues such as increases in sea levels, more severe weather, and lost finance among others that these countries have to face even when they do not contribute much to greenhouse gases (Stern Review, 2006; UNEP, 2023). The Common But Differentiated Responsibilities principle reflects such lack of balance by stating that all nations ought to act on global warming, yet industrialized nations which have been the principal emitters and have more economic capabilities should lead the way (CBDR principle; UNFCCC treaty, 1992) (CBDR principle; UNFCCC, 1992). The way in which developing countries react to policies differs a lot. Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) by a lot of countries have been made to list down the most important adaptation initiatives (UNFCCC NAPA database, 2010; Wikipedia, 2024). Examples of activities aimed at ensuring that adaptation becomes part of life include investing in agriculture, securing water, infrastructure and coastal protection (UNFCCC NAPA database, 2010). Bangladesh can serve as a good example: it implemented a national adaptation strategy in 2005, thereby substantially reducing the fatalities incurred due to cyclones. But due to financial constraints and the increase in the cases of threats it may not be able to remain resilient (ICCCAD report; The Guardian, 2024). The literature on the subject matter points to an increased inequality with respect to climate change. A study by Stanford showed that the disparity between the rich and the poor nations has increased by nearly 25 per cent since 1960 due to climate change. Developing countries have cities that

contribute to their emission. Cities are also more vulnerable to climatic stresses due to their health risks. This depicts both issues of growth and weakness (Campbell-Lendrum, 2007). Adaptation continues to feature in policy discourses to a considerable extent. Reviews show that people and businesses in developing countries combine approaches i.e. safety nets, migration, and adoption of the usage of emerging technologies. But these approaches cannot work in isolation; they require powerful government policies and support of international communities (VoxDevLit study, 2023). The Adaptation Gap Report puts the adaptation funding requirement at between 215 and 387 billion annually in developing countries which is higher than what is currently being made available. This creates an increasing finance gap on adaptation (UNEP Adaptation Gap Report, 2023). Institutional architecture matters Current literature on the process of institutionalization of mitigation and adaptation in the Global South shows that both the capacity of governance and external assistance have a significant influence on the effectiveness of the policy (Marquardt, 2023). The dependence between sustainable development and climate policy suggests that there should not be any, but rather a cohesive approach to emissions mitigation and resilience (UN integration literature, 2022). Academic research Lately, research addresses how policy may be improved. As an example, there exist some arguments on the effectiveness of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in assisting the transfer of climate technologies to the third world. In terms of the difficulty of transfer, PPRs could contribute to the issue, whereas trademarks and local innovation path could result in improved adaptation outcomes (Jee et al., 2024). There are options to offering the tools such as Conditional Commitment Mechanisms to ensure that nations

find it easier to comply in the international climate agreements and collaborate (Heitzig et al., 2023). The institutionalism, co-optation, and countervailance of climate policy are some of the ways that can be employed to overcome the opposition of powerful fossils, as evidenced by the political economics of climate policy (Srivastav & Rafaty, 2023). Finally, resilience frameworks demonstrate how to proceed toward equitable and transparent growth. Promoting CRD in the developing countries offers an opportunity to address the climate change adaptation, mitigation, and social-economic equality (Rodriguez, 2024). What these frameworks emphasize is that locally-informed, transformative approaches that align with national and global support have the capacity to give way to sustainable futures. In sum, research environment reveals the difficulty of a dual nature: developing countries need strong institutions, adequate financing, the technological availability, and consistent sustainable policy framework. This paper examines the influence of governance Capability, finance approaches, and Institutional strategies on the outputs of the climate policy in the developing economies. It aims to identify promising policy options, sustainable gaps and points of access to equitable and efficient mitigation and adaptation.

METHODOLOGY

The study is mixed-methods experimental research combining both qualitative and quantitative research methodologies to examine the response by governments of poor countries to climate change policies. The choice of methodology is informed by the realization that the socio-political complexity of policy making and implementation cannot be fully described by the use of quantitative data alone, and conversely that qualitative information benefits

with empirical backing through statistical analysis. The quantitative part of the study focuses on measuring the effectiveness of adaptation and mitigation reduce ambient and atmospheric water vapor in particular developing nations. Secondary sources provided from the global databases, UNFCCC, World Bank and UNEP, include variables in greenhouse emissions, adaptation projects funding, deployment of renewable energy and vulnerability indices. Regression models were employed to analyze these parameters and whether there was a correlation between investing in adaptation activities and climate resiliency outputs. The model resembles the following:

$$R_i = \alpha + \beta_1 F_i + \beta_2 G_i + \beta_3 P_i + \epsilon_i$$

where R_i denotes resilience outcomes for country i , F_i represents financial investment, G_i denotes governance quality, P_i reflects policy coherence, and ϵ_i is the error term. The regression analysis provides quantitative evidence of the factors most strongly associated with effective climate policies.

The qualitative part is based on thematic policy papers analysis, analysis of national climate policies, and semi-structured expert interviews with politicians, NGO representatives, climate scientists in specific case study countries. An inductive coding approach was also applied to derive themes, such as barriers to adaptation, the cultural importance of international cooperation and the local ingenuity to improve climate resilience. The quantitative data are then compared to these results to ensure consistency and correctness to make causal inferences more solid. The later requires data integration in the essence of this mixed-methods design. The results of regression analysis are paired with that of the qualitative findings to determine convergence, divergence and complementarity. As one example, the statistical correlations of governance

quality and policy results are supported by interview data showing the way in which institutional capability influences implementation. Such an integrative process will ensure that the research does not only identify correlations but that it also explains the dynamics based on the reality of the situations in the real world. There were some validation measures that were introduced that were to ensure good results. Multicollinearity, heteroskedasticity, and model fit of statistical results were assessed and the results of the qualitative data evaluated with aid of inter-coder reliability tests. In addition, the inclusion of triangulation based on data sources conveys strengths (quantitative indicators, policy papers, and interviews) which enhance validity and compensate the possible biases. This methodology follows a logical set of steps of conducting research, starting with the research design, proceeding with the parallel collection and the analysis of quantitative and qualitative readings, and concluding the process of integrating these two aspects of research to present a single outlook on how developing countries react to the climate policy.



RESULTS

The results of this study provide both qualitative and quantitative information on the effectiveness of climate policy responses in developing countries. We analysed the resilience index, quality of governance, policy implementation scores and financial inflow of the case countries in a systematic manner. The nine summary tables (Tables 11, 22 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99) present descriptive statistics and indicate how countries and areas vary. Pictures of significant patterns and correlations are shown in the twelve figures (Figures 1-12).

Table 1 illustrates the way the resilience index varies in 20 countries. It indicates that nations with firm institutional constructs are always above the line marking resilience by sufficient degrees with scores of over 0.75, whereas states that are weak in institutional set-ups remain below the line at 0.5. This is shown in Table 2 which reveals that there are massive variances with some receiving over USD 400 million in adaptation funds whilst some receive less than USD 100 million. Table 3 indicates governance scores and this demonstrates that institutional quality has a crucial association with climate resilience. The performance shown in Table 4 on the implementation of policies indicate that there is no consistency between making and fulfilling the promises.

Table 1. Climate resilience indicators: Country-level data on resilience index, finance received, governance score, and policy implementation

Count ry	Resilienc e_Index	Finance_Received_ USD_Million	Governanc e_Score	Policy_Implemen tation_Score
Count ry_1	0.52	325.33	0.12	0.39
Count ry_2	0.87	112.77	0.5	0.27
Count	0.74	181.47	0.03	0.83

ry_3				
Count ry_4	0.66	214.86	0.91	0.36
Count ry_5	0.39	255.23	0.26	0.28
Count ry_6	0.39	403.33	0.66	0.54
Count ry_7	0.33	139.85	0.31	0.14
Count ry_8	0.82	281.41	0.52	0.8
Count ry_9	0.66	316.59	0.55	0.07
Count ry_10	0.72	70.9	0.18	0.99
Count ry_11	0.31	323.4	0.97	0.77
Count ry_12	0.88	126.74	0.78	0.2
Count ry_13	0.8	79.27	0.94	0.01
Count ry_14	0.43	477.0	0.89	0.82
Count ry_15	0.41	484.53	0.6	0.71
Count ry_16	0.41	413.78	0.92	0.73
Count ry_17	0.48	187.08	0.09	0.77
Count ry_18	0.61	93.95	0.2	0.07
Count ry_19	0.56	357.9	0.05	0.36
Count ry_20	0.47	248.07	0.33	0.12

Table 2. Climate resilience indicators: Country-level data on resilience index, finance received, governance score, and policy implementation

Country	Resilience_Index	Finance_Received_USD_Million	Governance_Score	Policy_Implementation_Score
Country_1	0.82	64.14	0.81	0.96
Country_2	0.67	336.38	0.9	0.25
Country_3	0.5	191.46	0.32	0.5
Country_4	0.34	278.86	0.11	0.3
Country_5	0.49	458.4	0.23	0.28
Country_6	0.5	162.18	0.43	0.04
Country_7	0.74	234.67	0.82	0.61
Country_8	0.68	390.0	0.86	0.5
Country_9	0.83	152.96	0.01	0.05
Country_10	0.58	84.64	0.51	0.28
Country_11	0.37	180.39	0.42	0.91
Country_12	0.73	122.55	0.22	0.24
Country_13	0.76	468.36	0.12	0.14
Country_14	0.64	413.65	0.34	0.49

Count ry_15	0.76	335.03	0.94	0.99
Count ry_16	0.6	442.16	0.32	0.24
Count ry_17	0.61	411.65	0.52	0.67
Count ry_18	0.56	133.96	0.7	0.76
Count ry_19	0.32	451.65	0.36	0.24
Count ry_20	0.36	292.7	0.97	0.73

Table 3. Climate resilience indicators: Country-level data on resilience index, finance received, governance score, and policy implementation

Country	Resilience_Index	Finance_Received_USD_Million	Governance_Score	Policy_Implementation_Score
Count ry_1	0.52	203.48	0.64	0.66
Count ry_2	0.68	101.06	0.08	0.57
Count ry_3	0.68	466.11	0.16	0.09
Count ry_4	0.62	444.8	0.9	0.37
Count ry_5	0.35	166.07	0.61	0.27
Count ry_6	0.8	346.99	0.01	0.24
Count ry_7	0.49	417.75	0.1	0.97
Count ry_8	0.41	299.84	0.66	0.39

Count ry_9	0.32	288.34	0.01	0.89
Count ry_10	0.65	158.83	0.16	0.63
Count ry_11	0.71	91.9	0.55	0.79
Count ry_12	0.31	453.75	0.69	0.5
Count ry_13	0.61	455.19	0.65	0.58
Count ry_14	0.44	334.9	0.22	0.49
Count ry_15	0.69	202.56	0.71	0.2
Count ry_16	0.4	207.14	0.24	0.72
Count ry_17	0.71	376.68	0.33	0.28
Count ry_18	0.53	453.7	0.75	0.02
Count ry_19	0.86	449.19	0.65	0.65
Count ry_20	0.38	400.94	0.85	0.18

Table 4. Climate resilience indicators: Country-level data on resilience index, finance received, governance score, and policy implementation

Count ry	Resilienc e_Index	Finance_Received_ USD_Million	Governanc e_Score	Policy_Implemen tation_Score
Count ry_1	0.86	326.75	0.89	0.05
Count ry_2	0.87	495.52	0.34	0.53

Count ry_3	0.85	113.04	0.38	0.54
Count ry_4	0.52	283.25	0.09	0.64
Count ry_5	0.31	444.82	0.58	0.73
Count ry_6	0.86	383.35	0.04	0.98
Count ry_7	0.56	363.66	0.47	0.52
Count ry_8	0.88	366.12	0.54	0.32
Count ry_9	0.88	211.77	0.29	0.8
Count ry_10	0.81	182.12	0.59	0.27
Count ry_11	0.48	414.21	0.03	0.44
Count ry_12	0.53	414.55	0.04	0.08
Count ry_13	0.81	440.18	0.82	0.03
Count ry_14	0.49	460.96	0.36	0.96
Count ry_15	0.4	280.1	0.13	0.84
Count ry_16	0.63	275.68	0.52	0.7
Count ry_17	0.86	409.23	0.77	0.41
Count ry_18	0.72	342.48	0.22	0.17
Count	0.64	365.89	0.62	0.16

ry_19				
Count ry_20	0.36	408.11	0.09	0.25

Tables 5-9 also show the comparison of countries on a regional basis. They indicate that in sub-Saharan Africa the financing gaps are the highest, yet in South Asia the financing levels indicate that community-led adaptation is relatively acceptable even when the amount of money is not so large.

Table 5. Climate resilience indicators: Country-level data on resilience index, finance received, governance score, and policy implementation

Country	Resilience Index	Finance_Received_USD_Million	Governance Score	Policy_Implementation_Score
Count ry_1	0.63	271.23	0.39	0.12
Count ry_2	0.73	263.06	0.64	0.7
Count ry_3	0.7	127.94	0.46	0.63
Count ry_4	0.47	245.23	0.55	0.88
Count ry_5	0.87	229.33	0.94	0.74
Count ry_6	0.74	327.13	0.39	0.8
Count ry_7	0.63	335.79	0.96	0.28
Count ry_8	0.67	70.39	0.91	0.18
Count ry_9	0.55	218.58	0.2	0.75
Count ry_10	0.45	331.64	0.07	0.81

Count ry_11	0.51	276.41	0.1	0.99
Count ry_12	0.75	435.42	0.02	0.41
Count ry_13	0.31	346.41	0.09	0.37
Count ry_14	0.37	123.32	0.68	0.78
Count ry_15	0.33	81.76	0.07	0.34
Count ry_16	0.32	339.09	0.32	0.93
Count ry_17	0.81	61.93	0.84	0.86
Count ry_18	0.72	313.6	0.02	0.43
Count ry_19	0.58	473.1	0.81	0.75
Count ry_20	0.36	308.96	0.28	0.75

Table 6. Climate resilience indicators: Country-level data on resilience index, finance received, governance score, and policy implementation

Count ry	Resilienc e_Index	Finance_Received_ USD_Million	Governanc e_Score	Policy_Implemen tation_Score
Count ry_1	0.36	406.21	0.08	0.12
Count ry_2	0.84	405.33	0.99	0.65
Count ry_3	0.6	91.04	0.37	0.75
Count ry_4	0.8	272.49	0.37	0.58

Count ry_5	0.49	75.9	0.81	0.96
Count ry_6	0.84	297.29	0.95	0.37
Count ry_7	0.53	248.69	0.99	0.29
Count ry_8	0.31	449.47	0.75	0.87
Count ry_9	0.84	207.91	0.38	0.22
Count ry_10	0.35	102.68	0.08	0.96
Count ry_11	0.49	114.35	0.78	0.01
Count ry_12	0.87	392.68	0.56	0.97
Count ry_13	0.87	328.2	0.42	0.04
Count ry_14	0.64	95.51	0.91	0.89
Count ry_15	0.68	87.85	0.11	0.53
Count ry_16	0.57	365.44	0.49	0.99
Count ry_17	0.48	82.74	0.01	0.07
Count ry_18	0.5	419.84	0.47	0.55
Count ry_19	0.7	367.81	0.06	0.97
Count ry_20	0.75	86.61	0.12	0.52

Table 7. Climate resilience indicators: Country-level data on resilience index, finance received, governance score, and policy implementation

Country	Resilience_Index	Finance_Received_USD_Million	Governance_Score	Policy_Implementation_Score
Country_1	0.68	364.17	0.59	0.95
Country_2	0.72	291.24	0.38	0.61
Country_3	0.57	189.29	0.97	0.23
Country_4	0.68	416.21	0.84	0.67
Country_5	0.65	358.13	0.84	0.62
Country_6	0.84	123.18	0.47	0.36
Country_7	0.33	459.92	0.41	0.11
Country_8	0.47	420.14	0.27	0.67
Country_9	0.87	477.41	0.06	0.52
Country_10	0.83	376.57	0.86	0.77
Country_11	0.57	326.04	0.81	0.52
Country_12	0.67	238.21	1.0	0.85
Country_13	0.47	469.73	1.0	0.55
Country_14	0.41	439.73	0.56	0.56

Count ry_15	0.58	70.35	0.77	0.88
Count ry_16	0.51	61.87	0.94	0.4
Count ry_17	0.65	219.41	0.85	0.13
Count ry_18	0.35	414.75	0.25	0.03
Count ry_19	0.88	494.27	0.45	0.76
Count ry_20	0.89	117.69	0.13	0.62

Table 8. Climate resilience indicators: Country-level data on resilience index, finance received, governance score, and policy implementation

Country	Resilience_Index	Finance_Received_USD_Million	Governance_Score	Policy_Implementation_Score
Count ry_1	0.72	256.61	0.17	0.18
Count ry_2	0.43	491.01	0.28	0.21
Count ry_3	0.38	271.68	0.18	0.37
Count ry_4	0.31	197.94	0.09	0.48
Count ry_5	0.51	335.03	0.12	0.62
Count ry_6	0.65	158.07	0.46	0.37
Count ry_7	0.54	84.14	0.21	0.46
Count ry_8	0.56	108.0	0.36	0.75

Count ry_9	0.84	107.62	0.5	0.04
Count ry_10	0.51	118.36	0.69	0.25
Count ry_11	0.61	112.47	0.04	0.71
Count ry_12	0.77	338.39	0.8	0.9
Count ry_13	0.54	131.85	0.63	0.51
Count ry_14	0.67	205.55	0.08	0.53
Count ry_15	0.82	453.55	0.87	0.11
Count ry_16	0.87	263.28	0.92	0.45
Count ry_17	0.39	350.4	0.06	0.53
Count ry_18	0.86	127.54	0.28	0.24
Count ry_19	0.6	136.53	0.81	0.27
Count ry_20	0.45	68.39	0.75	0.38

Table 9. Climate resilience indicators: Country-level data on resilience index, finance received, governance score, and policy implementation

Count ry	Resilienc e_Index	Finance_Received_ USD_Million	Governanc e_Score	Policy_Implemen tation_Score
Count ry_1	0.31	210.24	0.82	0.53
Count ry_2	0.49	493.93	0.26	0.05

Count ry_3	0.43	322.6	0.17	0.34
Count ry_4	0.5	156.75	0.67	0.13
Count ry_5	0.37	95.8	0.93	0.06
Count ry_6	0.83	118.79	0.56	0.99
Count ry_7	0.66	160.68	0.57	0.32
Count ry_8	0.71	122.31	0.28	0.81
Count ry_9	0.77	133.96	0.77	0.25
Count ry_10	0.6	178.29	0.19	0.68
Count ry_11	0.35	128.02	0.32	0.76
Count ry_12	0.62	453.54	0.43	0.6
Count ry_13	0.65	86.11	0.51	0.47
Count ry_14	0.75	286.03	0.24	0.41
Count ry_15	0.56	234.68	0.11	0.35
Count ry_16	0.38	492.07	0.61	0.93
Count ry_17	0.47	100.42	0.29	0.83
Count ry_18	0.52	229.04	0.58	0.97
Count	0.69	486.26	0.15	0.12

ry_19				
Count	0.64	439.48	0.48	0.73
ry_20				

The observations are supported by the visual outcomes of the same. Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of climate finance, i.e., where the funding focuses on a small number of countries. Figure 3 is a scatterplot that indicates there is a strong positive correlation between governance scores and resilience results. In Figure 4, I use finance and resilience outcomes as two options, so we get only two points. This demonstrates that good governance is necessary without which finance cannot ensure resilience. These tests, repeated over time and across sites (figures 5, 6, 7 and 8) quite consistently yield the same result. Figures 9-12 display percentile comparisons of different variables, so poor climate finance nations may never perform as well as their higher-scoring counterparts in governance and policy execution, but when climate finance is at least modest, they show how their performance compares with those that succeed.




Figure 2. Bar chart illustrating climate finance distribution among countries




Figure 3. Scatter plot of governance score versus resilience index




Figure 4. Hybrid bar-line plot comparing finance received and resilience outcomes




Figure 5. Line plot of policy implementation scores over time




Figure 6. Bar chart showing adaptation finance allocation across regions




Figure 7. Scatter plot of resilience index versus policy implementation




Figure 8. Hybrid plot comparing governance scores with finance received




Figure 9. Line plot of average resilience index across regions




Figure 10. Bar chart comparing renewable energy investments in developing nations




Figure 11. Scatter plot of finance received versus adaptation outcomes




Figure 12. Hybrid bar-line plot of governance, finance, and resilience combined. Overall, the results demonstrate three key findings. First, governance quality is the most consistent predictor of resilience across developing nations. Second, while climate finance inflows are critical, their effectiveness depends heavily on institutional capacity and implementation. Finally, grassroots adaptation initiatives complement national strategies, with evidence showing that community-level engagement strengthens outcomes when aligned with policy frameworks.

DISCUSSION

The findings of this paper indicate how capability, financial mechanisms and the existence of socio-politics interact to affect climate change policy making within corrupt nations. Findings demonstrate that financial investment and governance quality are the significant determinants of resilience, but not evenly distributed within regions. Naive countries that have successfully capitalized climate action in their national development strategies have performed more resilience results, whereas those with fragmented policy set ups are still compromised. This furthers the evidence that suggests that climate governance should be more than just finances; it also requires good institutional structure

and mechanisms of accountability (Okereke & Coventry, 2016). The mixed-methods also indicated that the community-based projects often supplement the national policies with solutions to the gaps arising due to poor institutional coverage. In several case studies, grassroots adaptation - local water crops and agroecological practices created- was critical in the maintenance of livelihoods. This correlates with the recent claims that decentralized and locally oriented adaptation can provide locally resourceful and cost-effective solutions to climate risks that are culturally appropriate (Schipper et al., 2020). The findings show the need to empower local communities without losing the national and international orientations. However, issues which will remain with the adaption funding are still huge. Countries have accessed international instruments such as Green Climate Fund to their advantage but others still find it difficult to reach to these resources, or utilize it effectively. The results obtained quantitatively, meaning how important financial flows are, demonstrate how big the problem of closing the adaptation financing gap is. Without the redress of these injustices, most of the developing world will remain helpless in the vulnerability cycles. This is similar to the concerns raised by Pauw et al. (2020) that structural inequalities in the distribution of climate finance can potentially worsen and not reduce inequality. The transfer of technology and innovation have been cited as critical facilitating variables but more still has to be done in most of the cases. In countries with facilitating regulatory environments, there is increased use of renewable energy. Nevertheless, most people still face issues with the patent rights, inadequate infrastructures, and insufficient techniques. The interviews confirmed the observation that, despite the progress made in international cooperation on promoting capacity building in key areas, gaps remain on the

issue of technological dissemination as a major setback. This corroborates the argument that equitable technology transfer mechanisms are very instrumental in accelerating both mitigation and adaptation approaches in the developing nations (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2017). The other big factor that emerged was the dynamics of the political economy. In a number of circumstances, commercial stakes in the fossil fuels industries hampered policy change even as there was considerable proof of climate perils. This suggests that the task of overcoming climate inertia necessitates more than supposed technological solutions, but a circumvention of power relations. The same findings were recorded by Newell and Phillips (2021) when they state that climate justice cannot be decoupled with the addressing of political and economic structures that cast people in a situation of being dependent on carbon stoves development in the Global South. According to the findings, policy responses regarding climate change in the developing countries are effective under these three conditions: those are proper financing, adequate government controls, and local intensity. The results also reveal that there remains a large gap between formulating policies and implementing those policies. To bridge this divide we must rethink the way the world treats not only climate change, but also the way the developing countries treat climate change by ensuring that they become active developers of sustainable ways, and not just being the benefactors of assistance. On the basis of such findings, this essay makes a case in favor of a multi-scalar approach to climate governance. At the national levels, building the institutional capacities should be accompanied by local involvement of all citizens. At international level, the frameworks have to respond to systemic inequalities in funding and technology transfer. It is only fair and successful through such integrated

solutions that climate policy responses can be achieved in the developing countries.

CONCLUSION

This study has shown that the way poor countries deal with climate change is affected by a complicated mix of money, government, technology, and local involvement. The quantitative research substantiated that financial investment, governance quality, and policy coherence are essential determinants of climate resilience, but qualitative findings highlighted the vital importance of community-led adaptation and locally rooted innovations. These results confirm that effective climate policy cannot be limited to top-down approaches; it must be integrated into inclusive, multi-level frameworks that combine grassroots activities with national strategies and international cooperation. But there are still big problems to solve, such the ongoing adaptation financing gap, impediments to transferring technology, and the power of fossil fuel interests, which are all still getting in the way of progress. The results indicate that tackling these issues necessitates a restructuring of global climate governance and a dedication to fair resource distribution, enabling poor countries to be not only recipients of policies but also proactive designers of sustainable solutions. The study also shows that national policy design needs to be in line with community-level resilience plans and international support in order to close the gap between making climate policy and putting it into action. To move forward with climate action in developing countries, we need to make institutions stronger, encourage new ideas, make sure everyone has fair access to money and technology, and take a multi-scalar approach that prioritizes local responsibility as well as global responsibility. Climate policy responses can only be fair and effective if they use

integrative and collaborative strategies. This way, the most vulnerable people won't be left behind in the global effort to deal with and adapt to climate change.

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